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Goods and Virtues by Michael Slote. Clarendon Press, 1983. pp. 148. $19.95.

Reviewed by ALASDAIR MAcINTYRE, Vanderbilt University.
Michael Slote has written an admirable book of a kind too seldom attempted
by philosophers. His central concern is not so much to develop a systematic
point of view as to identify a range of important considerations which have too
often been ignored or put on one side. What he provides is both an agenda of
difficulties for moral enquiry and a series of summonses to greater complexity.
His central theses are all developed at some length, but he allows himself to
make some interesting brief excursions and in so doing not to be haunted by a
need always to say something conclusive. This is moral philosophy self-consciously understood, as all philosophy ought to be understood, as contributions
to a continuing conversation.
In his first chapter Slote advances objections to the view developed by Thomas
Nagel according to which rationality requires that all the periods of a person's
life be treated as equally relevant and given equal weight in providing reasons
for action at any given moment. So that if it is true that I am going in ten years
time to have a reason for doing something or other (and I know it-the formulation
of this view raises interesting questions about both the logical and the epistemological status of future contingents), I now have a reason for doing something or
other in ten years time. Hence anything that I must do now, if I am to do
whatever it is in ten years time, I now have a reason to do. Not so, says Slote.
There are some specific periods in human life one of whose central characteristics
is that from the point of view that they afford what has happened or is going to
happen at certain other periods is unimportant. There are goods which are specific
to particular periods of a person's life, which are irrelevant in other periods.
Slote notes that this view commits him to a way of understanding the unity
of a human life which is very different from that advanced by Nagel and suggests,
obviously rightly, that his own view has some affinity to Aristotle's. He does
not pursue this suggestion and therefore does not notice how much of Aristotle's
moral and political thinking presupposes that the activities, goods and virtues
important at one stage of life differ from those of others. This is, for example,
the key to Aristotle's thesis about the place of theoria in human life.
In his second chapter Slote argues that some virtues too are specific to particular
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periods of life; they are virtues only relative to some time of life and are to be
contrasted with virtues tout court. Patience and justice are cited as examples of
the latter; but the prudence involved in adopting and following a rational life-plan
is not. A certain kind of innocent trustfulness, incompatible with rational prudence, is a virtue in children, but would be foolish in adults. The prudence of
a rational life-plan is a virtue specific to adult life, and those who have treated
it as a virtue tout court, such as John Rawls, have been mistaken.
The concepts of a relative virtue and a relative good have other kinds of
application. Religious faith may be a good for many people, if it makes them
happy, even if God does not exist. If God does exist, then relative to that fact,
religious faith, since it enables us to believe what is true, may be a virtue. This
last example does suggest that the distinction between what Slote calls 'relative
virtues' and what he calls 'virtues tout court' or 'absolute virtues' needs more
examination. For Slote says of the former that their status as virtues depends
"on facts about how human needs vary over time or on deep (contingent) facts
about man's place in the universe, rather than in anything subject to human
choice or affectable by human belief' (p. 59). I am far from clear about the
precise contrast that Slote intends to convey. But there are strong reasons for
holding that the status of all virtues as virtues depends on facts about man's
place in the universe; were the universe to be different in crucial respects, the
virtues would not be virtues. Yet if all virtues-including patience and justiceare virtues only relative to certain facts, how is the distinction between relative
and absolute virtues to be formulated?
The third chapter advances the thesis that there are virtues which "only count
as such when they are attended by certain other virtues" and goods which in
similar fashion are to be and are treated as such "only to the extent that further
goods underlie them" (p. 61). So, Slote argues, conscientiousness is a trait which
is to be accounted a virtue only when joined in a character to certain other traits,
such as what he calls 'common human decency, a humane sense of values'.
Conscientiousness in a Nazi is not a virtue. "Unless we are prepared to hold-as
most people would be reluctant to do--that anyone who acts from conscience
automatically does what is right (for him to do), we are not likely to admire the
conscientiousness of a Nazi prison-camp guard whose sense of duty dictated that
he should simply follow orders, however 'disagreeable'" (p. 63).
We need however to examine a little more closely wherein the badness of
such a person lies. A conscientiously cruel prison-guard will characteristically
be a worse person than his or her lackadaisical and lazy counterpart. But he or
she will be worse precisely because he or she will behave with more cruelty
more often. To be cruel to the same degree and to lack conscientiuosness would
be to be even worse. Or so at least Aquinas argued and without making the least
concession to the view that anyone who acts from conscience does what is right.
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Slote gives us no reasons for rejecting Aquinas's view.
He also asserts something in his fourth chapter that Aquinas denies~nce
again without alluding to Aquinas's discussion-where he claims that there are
virtues the exercise of which runs counter to morality, traits that are at once
admirable and immoral. Slote's example is "Churchill's single-minded, passionate devotion to Allied victory" (p. 95) in World War II, a single-mindedness
which led him to approve the fire-bombing of civilian targets. Slote thinks that
only someone under the sway of an a priori thesis to the effect that moral
considerations must always be overriding would distinguish that in Churchill's
resoluteness which was necessary for victory but compatible with the acceptance
of moral constraints from Churchill's actual morally unconstrained (in certain
respects) single-mindedness and find the former admirable, but not the latter.
This dismissive attitude enables Slote to avoid evaluating the arguments which
have led Aquinas and others to conclude that it is never permissible (or admirable)
to do evil so that good may ensue.
Slote understands himself as championing distinctions embodied in "ordinary
moral thinking" and "tendencies" of "everyday thinking" which philosophers
have overlooked in the interests of their a priori theorising. It is not quite clear
whether what he takes to be ordinary prephilosophical moral thinking is, on his
view, to be treated as authoritative no matter what philosophers may urge, or
only to be treated as authoritative unless and until some cogent theoretical alternative is constructed. But on either construal there are difficulties which Slote
has not faced. His claims about everyday moral thinking are presumably empirical
claims, but he offers no evidence in their favor, and it is far from clear that they
are all true. Moreover Slote's merely negative remarks about philosophical
theories leave the reader to guess what he takes a successful philosophical theory
to achieve in this area. And this is all the more disappointing because in the last
two chapters Slote defends views which seem to need larger theoretical support
than he provides.
Slote in these chapters attacks first John McDowell's Platonic thesis that the
truly virtuous person who by pursuing virtue foregoes pleasures or wealth loses
nothing of value, and secondly what Slote takes to be the Stoic claim that for
the ideal person at least the attachments represented by love and friendship are
not goods, but rather weaknesses incompatible with the genuine good of self-sufficiency. Slote provides arguments designed to show that pleasure and friendship
have the status of goods in such a way that they cannot be deprived of that status
in situations in which their cultivation is incompatible with what virtue requires.
But what his arguments need, but lack is the backing of a general and comprehensive theory of goods and virtues. In the absence of such a theory the considerations
which Slote urges upon us are necessarily inconclusive.
I suggested at the outset that the inconclusiveness of this book is bound up
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with its peculiar merits as a stimulus to further enquiry. I add to that now the
observation that anyone who is to benefit from the stimulus will have to reconsider
Slote's arguments from just the kind of standpoint that he himself abjures-at
least in this book, the kind of standpoint provided by some large-scale moral
theory, such as Aristotle's, or Aquinas's, or Hume's.

Where the Passion Is: A Reading of Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fragments,
by H. A. Nielsen. Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1983.204 pages.

Reviewed by STEPHEN N. DUNNING, University of Pennsylvania.
This is an engaging and illuminating book, one which will appeal especially
to readers who come to Kierkegaard's Fragments not so much to learn about
Kierkegaard as to think with him about the problem of knowledge of God.
Although Nielsen's own argument-that Fragments is a genuine interpretation
of New Testament teaching-is not developed until the final pages, his extensive
"remarks" on each of the chapters are informed by his conviction that Fragments
is a philosophical restatement of the biblical idea that faith and human reason
are ultimately antithetical. Thus he writes in the Preface of the "brilliant contrast"
between philosophy and the New Testament (p. ix), and concludes the book
with the claim that Fragments presents Christianity as "the detonation on earth
of something not of this world" (p. 203). It is this claim which lends unity to
the entire project, and which boldly challenges the assumed autonomy and selfsufficiency of philosophical reason.
There are two matters which I wish to discuss in this short review, which
illustrate respectively what strike me as the outstanding strength and the single
weakness of Where the Passion Is. The first involves the complex metaphysical
issues raised in Fragments, whereas the second has to do with the difficult
question of the relation between philosophical reflection and the methods of
historical research.
Although Nielsen explores metaphysical matters throughout the book, his
analysis of chapter III, "The Absolute Paradox: A Metaphysical Crotchet," serves
nicely as a demonstration of his approach. The argument that Climacus states
in chapter III is that God is the Unknown which is "the limit to which the Reason
repeatedly comes" (Fragments, p. 55). Nielsen carefully and insightfully unpacks
this concept of God by showing that it is, in Wittgenstein's sense, a "grammatical"
rather than a cognitive statement. Both traditional theists and atheists are castigated for trying to grasp "the language of transcendence wrongly as a set of
substantive knowing-claims" (p. 79). On the contrary, knowledge about God
cannot be abstractly conceived in referential terms: its meaning is to be found

